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**1. SOVIET AMBASSADOR GAINS AUDIENCE WITH  
SAUDI KING**

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King Saud received Soviet ambassador Lavrentiev in Tehran on 16 August, since the ambassador's repeated efforts to see him were becoming "embarrassing." According to a Saudi Foreign Ministry official, Lavrentiev spoke insistently of the desirability of exchanging diplomatic representatives. He said the USSR is greatly interested in arming the Saudi forces and requested a statement of the kinds and quantities of weapons the Saudis desired.

The king promised to study the questions raised by the ambassador, but spoke frankly of the religious and political differences between Saudi Arabia and the Soviet Union.

**Comment**

The Soviet ambassador's extraordinary efforts to see Saud, in addition to recent Soviet overtures of a similar nature to Egypt, indicate the extent of Soviet efforts to exploit the differences between these Arab states and the West on Middle East defense planning.

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### **3. HUNGARIAN INTERNAL POLICIES MAY BE MODERATED**

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The Hungarian central committee decided at a meeting on 5 or 6 August to shift to a more moderate line in Hungary's internal policies, according to an unconfirmed report received by the American legation in Budapest.

The legation comments that if this report is true, it may account for the marked slowing down in deportations from Budapest during the past few days, and may explain the hurried and incomplete preparations which were apparent behind Rakosi's 8 August address at Csepel. Rakosi's speech dealt with internal matters in a tone more moderate than has been observed in recent months.

#### **Comment**

The tone of Rakosi's 8 August speech probably reflects his effort to get back in line with Soviet policy, which is to make Communist political control in the Satellites more palatable. During the past six months, political repression and coercion have characterized the Hungarian Communists' efforts to re-establish party discipline and tighten their control of the country.